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Strategic considerations
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Introduction
1 This workshop, organized in Jerusalem by the ‘Centre de recherche français  à Jérusalem’
(CRFJ),  the  Hebrew  University  and  Sciences  Po  Paris, provided  a  great  and  rare
opportunity to exchange views between researchers and diplomats on the impacts of the
Arab Awakening on EU relations  with Israel  and its  neighbors.  By bringing together
historians, political scientists, orientalists, economists and diplomats, it enabled to draw
up an exciting interdisciplinary perspective on the upheavals shaking the Middle East and
challenging  the  previous  regional  Status  Quo.  We  are  indeed  grateful  to  all  the
participants for making this event a success thanks to their active participation. This
introduction resumes the debates that took place during a closed roundtable among the
researchers and briefly presents the different articles of this publication. As a matter of
fact,  the  impact  of  the  Arab  Spring,  starting  with  the  popular  revolts  in  Tunisia  in
December 2010/January 2011,  on  Israel’s  and  the  EU’s  regional  policies,  and  on  their
mutual relationships, remains to be investigated. 
2 Regarding  the  EU,  it  used  this  opportunity  to  give  new  momentum  to  its  bilateral
relations with the Arab states concerned. As a matter of fact, the Council of the European
Union  decided  to  launch  official  negotiations,  through  the  adoption  of  negotiating
directives,  to  reach  Deep  and  Comprehensive  Free  Trade  agreements  (DCFTAs)  with
Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia in December 2011, going beyond the scope of their
current  association agreements.  By contrast,  the EU decided to impose financial  and
energetic sanctions as well as arms embargo on Syria in view of the refusal of President
Assad  to  step  aside  and  launch  a  political  transition  in  the  context  of  the  ongoing
intensive large-scale armed conflict leading to the death of more than 100 000 Syrians.
The counterpart of the EU’s new Neighborhood policy’s motto, ‘More for More’, is thus
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‘Less for Less’ in case of non-compliance with the EU’s political preferences. It is worth
noting  that  this  new  European  policy  towards  its  southern  neighborhood,  based  on
effective political conditionality and on bilateral relations, aimed first and foremost at
restoring its reputation among Arab societies, tarnished notably since its support to the
unelected Fatah government  in  the  West  Bank from 2007 and to  authoritarian Arab
regimes. 
3 With  regard  to  Israel,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  upheavals  in  Egypt,  its  government
contemplated the idea to renegotiate its peace treaty with Egypt, notably regarding the
status of Sinai, and at the same time observed closely the developments in Syria, fearful
that they could trigger a worsening in their already tense relations. In the West Bank,
Palestinians demonstrated against the rising cost of living, and have been more and more
skeptical about the role of the Palestinian Authority (PA), while Hamas leadership in Gaza
has been weakened in the aftermath of the removal of the Egyptian President Mohammed
Morsi from power in July 2013. As decision-makers hardly know how to react when ‘world
politics  outruns  their  imaginations’,  to  paraphrase  Robert  Jervis1,  the  ‘wait  and  see’
approach adopted by the Israeli government appeared to its main leaders as the least
worst option in this context. 
4 The years 2013 and 2014 essentially witnessed a step backward towards the old Status
quo. Many in Europe were predicting the necessity for Israel to change its policy and
attitude towards its future Arab democratic neighbors. A democratic Egypt would compel
Israel to provide Palestinians with their own state as a pre-condition for the recognition
of  their  peace  treaty.  Yet,  this  scenario  did  not  materialize.  On  the  contrary,  the
legitimately  elected  government  of  Morsi  in  Egypt  was  toppled  and  the  Muslim
brotherhood ostracized by the interim military government. Assad’s government in Syria
has also proved to be, against the initial assessments of the EU and Israel, particularly
resilient. The benefits of the carrot and stick approach of the renewed European policy in
the southern Mediterranean region are not obvious in this context. The EU’s strategy
predicated  on  the  conditionality  approach  of  the  enlargement  policy  appears  as  ill
adapted to the actual capacity and willingness of the Arab states concerned. 
5 Nevertheless, as the course of events of the Arab Awakening have already shown, it would
be particularly unwise to predict the stability of the current regional ‘Status Quo’. As a
consequence, researchers ought to be particularly cautious when analyzing the impacts
of these Arab upheavals as they can only be assessed in a long-term perspective. Yet, this
new  regional  context  does  require  researchers  a  rethinking  of  their  assumptions
regarding a few important matters. 
6 That was the general goal pursued by the roundtable. Is the Israeli regional policy (or
non-policy) well adapted to these new challenges? Does the Arab Awakening change the
way the Palestinian issue should be dealt with both in Israel and in the EU? Does it impact
substantially the development of the EU-Israel relations? To what extent do they affect
the phenomena of anti-Semitism in Europe? These were some of the questions and issues
addressed by the participants during an exciting and lively debate. This introduction will
be structured accordingly. 
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Israel’s foreign policy and the Arab Awakening 
7 First, Matthieu Cimino raised the issue of Israel’s response to the regional upheavals: Does
the fact of having no policy, more specifically towards Syria, constitutes a policy per se?
Participants stressed the risk of a partition of Syria and of the danger of the rise of
extremism, more particularly among the rebels. Matthieu, in his article dealing with the
representation of foreign fighters by the Syrian opposition, points out that the djihadists
among the opposition to Assad’s regime were often framed as traitors or collaborators by
the rebels, while being also perceived as a particularly effective force on the operational
level.  Despite  the  danger  of  the  rise  in  power  of  the  djihadists  within  the  Syrian
opposition,  the  Israeli  government  preferred  generally  to  keep  a  low profile  and  to
abstain  from  supporting  one  party  or  the  other.  Yet,  if  deterrence  reveals  itself
insufficient, the IDF has proven to be willing to act preemptively on the Syrian territory2.
8 The participants reacted differently to Israel’s attitude. Daniel Halevy-Goetschel, head of
the international department of the Center for Policy Research of the Israeli ministry of
Foreign Affairs, asserted that doing nothing was not an option for Israel. Colin Shindler,
emeritus professor at the SOAS-University of London, added that, in this specific case,
having no policy was indeed a policy. He recalled that Israel’s cautious policy – resulting
from its unpopularity among Arabs – did not exclude targeted attacks so that keeping a
low  profile  did  not  prevent  action  when  deemed  as  necessary.  Another  participant
remarked that a ‘balkanization’ of the region could even turn out to be in Israel’s interest
so that the ‘doing almost nothing’ would be the best option.
9 For his  part,  Lior  Herman,  lecturer  at  the Hebrew University,  noted that  this  Israeli
response towards the Arab upheaval did not mean that Israel had no regional foreign
policy at all. He took the example of Israel’s relations with Turkey in the aftermath of the
Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010 and recalled that Israel has a reconciliation policy. As
a matter of fact, Israel eventually apologized to Turkey in March 2013 enabling a thaw in
their  relations.  In  the  context  of  the  Arab uprising,  this  diplomatic  breakthrough is
supposed to permit Israel to restore dialogue and information sharing with its former
Islamic ally,  as well  as lessening the Israeli  sense of strategic isolation in the region.
However,  by  the  15th of  April 2014  when  this  introduction  was  written,  despite  the
declared willingness of both governments to sign a ‘compensation agreement’ after the
March 2014 elections in Turkey, the two parties did not manage to do so. The agreement,
that would supposedly enable the normalization of their relations, is difficult to reach for
both  Israel  and  Turkey  for  domestic  and  foreign  policy  reasons,  despite  a  common
interest in ensuring regional stability and in preventing extremists to come to power
more specifically in Syria3. Moreover, though a rapprochement may materialize in the
future,  Turkey will  be far more hesitant than in the past to revive its  close military
relationship  with  Israel.  Ilan  Greilsammer,  professor  of  political  science  at  Bar-Ilan
University, regretted that there is no strategic thinking in Israel regarding this matter as
well as others and argued that Israel has only a reactive policy.
 
Impacts on the Palestinian question 
10 Benedetta Berti and Caroline du Plessix point out in their paper – comparing the EU’s
narratives and policies implemented in the context of the Arab Awakening with Israel’s
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– that the EU and Israel draw contrasting conclusions as to the potential impacts of the
uprisings on the Palestinian question.  Israel’s  government argued that these regional
upheavals  eventually demonstrate that  the Palestinian-Israeli  conflict  is  not  the core
driver of the regional problems, but instead, that the problem is rather internal and has
to do with radical Islamism within Arab societies. The EU and its Member States insisted,
more particularly during the first years of the upheavals, that these events demonstrated
the aspiration of Arab nations to democracy. According to them, the upheavals would
have provided Israel with a rare opportunity to prioritize the Palestinian question on its
domestic agenda. It could have enabled eventually a future normalization of its relations
with its Arab neighbors, in the spirit of the 2002 Arab peace initiative. Tsilla Hershco,
Research associate at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) stresses in her
article that this disagreement between the EU and Israel as to the priority level of the
Palestinian  question  has  been,  for  some  time,  one  of  the  main  impediments  to  the
deepening  of  their  mutual  strategic  relations.  More  generally,  Bernard  Philippe,  a
diplomat of the newly created European External Action Service (EEAS), is pointing out in
his contribution the difficulty for the EU in sharing its own experience of peacebuilding
with Israel and the Palestinians. 
11 It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  uprisings  in  the  Arab  world  have  also  become  an
increasing source of concern for European leaders. Whereas the Palestinian question has
often been framed in the European discourse as crucial for reaching a lasting peace and
stability in the region4, the main reason for the rising regional instability was not in this
case the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but political and economic factors present within the
Arab states concerned. As a consequence, the EU invested relatively more political energy
and financial help to cope with the upheavals in the Arab states than to engage with the
Palestinian question. While the EU, together with the European investment bank and the
European bank for research and development, pledged an additional financial package of
5 billion euros during a meeting of the EU-Egypt Task Force in November 2012, Member
States’ contributions to the financial mechanisms dedicated to the PA, PEGASE, and more
particularly its direct financial support, dropped by 22% from 2011 to 20125. The context
of  economic  crisis  in  Europe  does  provide  the  main  explanation  for  the  relative
decreasing EU funding to the PA that still accounted for 451.7 million euros in 2012. Even
though, ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained in this context a “high priority
and a fundamental EU interest”6, recalled Lady Ashton, the EU high representative for
foreign affairs and security policy.
12 Ilan  Greilsammer  deplored  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that the  whole  international
community, including the EU, is supporting the option of a Palestinian state, the current
right wing Israeli government continues playing with the idea of a Jordan-Palestinian
federation. The so-called ‘Jordanian option’ had been on the negotiation table at least
until the end of the Jordanian authority in the West Bank and East-Jerusalem after the
1967 Six-Day war. It was buried after the Jordanian administrative disengagement from
the  West  Bank  in  19887.  Since  then,  the  Israeli  government  is  confronted  with  the
‘Palestinian option’ supported mainly by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in
other words the Palestinian willingness to create an independent state. Therefore, the
Jordanian option appears today to many as outdated given its lack of political realism.
Nevertheless,  discussions  are  still  held  on  the  possibility  of  a  Jordanian-Palestinian
confederation  in  the  aftermath  of  an  Israeli-Palestinian  peace  agreement8.  A
confederation would provide both entities with full sovereignty, contrary to a federation.
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As a matter of fact, Lior Herman underlined that the implementation of the federalist
option would mean the end of the Hashemite kingdom while the royal family’s power is
already  decreasing.  Palestinians  already  constitute  around  half  of  the  Jordanian
population.  If  the  West  Bank  population  were  to  be  added,  the  Palestinians  would
represent an absolute majority of the federation’s population and the Hashemite family
would  face  problems,  more  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  Arab  Awekening,  in
justifying its hold on power. What’s more, Jordan economic growth is currently hampered
by the cost of accommodating hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees fleeing the civil
war  started  in  the  first  half  of  2011.  For  all  these  reasons,  the  Jordan-Israel  Peace
agreement signed in 1994 could also be affected by the creation of such a federation due
to its potential demographic and political impacts. 
13 Yet,  Alfred  Tovias,  Professor  at  the  Hebrew university,  noted  that  the  creation of  a
Jordan-Palestinian state or confederation could eventually serve Europe’s interests as it
could permit to put an end to the territorial problem that arose in the aftermath of the
Second World War. He stressed that while he defended the partition option after the Six
Days  War,  meaning  the  evacuation  of  the  occupied  territories,  Israel’s  governments’
policy since then made the implementation of the idea of a Palestinian state unrealistic
on the ground. Therefore, according to him, other options should be proposed. As an
example, he alluded to the potential role the EU could play to improve the Palestinian
economic situation.  He exposed the positive economic effects  on both Israel  and the
Palestinian territories (except Gaza) that would have the EU-Israel free-trade agreement
on agricultural products signed in 2009 as well as the open-sky agreement signed by the
EU and Israel in 2012. Nevertheless, Lior Herman argued that the role of the EU is doomed
to be very limited anyway as only four major world powers really count in the region
– the U.S., Russia, Turkey and Iran. He argued that, as long as Europeans will be divided
politically, their influence will remain weak. 
14 Julie Trottier,  director of  research at the CNRS (French National  Center for scientific
research),  recalled  that  the  EU  does  have  important  levers  of  influence  vis-à-vis
Palestinians. As a matter of fact, the PA remains financially accountable to the EU given
that the latter’s and its Member States’ funding account for more than half of the PA’s
budget. Caroline du Plessix added that from 2000 to 2009, the EU alone – not including the
Member  States’  bilateral  aid  – provided the  Palestinians  with  almost  5  billion  euros,
including the aid to the United Nation’s agency for the Palestinian refugees (UNRWA).
Alfred Tovias questioned if this financial help was not in fact helping Israel to maintain
occupation instead of resolving the conflict. This remark echoed the EU declaration in
December 2013 stating that if peace talks were to fail, the EU would reconsider its aid to
Palestinians so that Israel will have to assume directly the cost of occupation9. Yet, this
declaration aimed first of all at putting pressure on Israel politically in the context of a
moribund peace process. As a matter of fact, it is very doubtful that the EU would carry
out its threat in such a context, due to the risk entailed by such a decision in terms of
regional stability and given the EU’s general aversion to risk10. 
15 With regard to the impacts of occupation on the Israeli society, a participant deplored
that  Israeli  families  were  still  sacrificing  their  children  as  conscription  remains
mandatory  in  Israel.  Eléonore  Merza,  Associate  Researcher  at  the  CRFJ,  added  that
conscientious objectors in Israel – young men or women refusing to do their military
service on the ground of freedom of thought, conscious and/or religion – were numerous.
According  to  the  website  of  the  Israeli  ‘refuseniks’,  the  conscientious  objector  called
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Sarvanimin Hebrew, a survey conducted by the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies (סרבנים) 
(now the Institute for National Security Studies)  showed that over 25% of all  Israelis
sympathized with their struggle and acknowledge the civil right and moral duty to refuse
to  serve  the  occupation11.  Eléonore  recalled  that  the  protests  for  social  justice
that took place in Israel in 2011, illustrated the fact that Israelis ‘want their ,(חברתי צדק)
money back’ and are aware of the cost of occupation. Alfred Tovias countered that these
protests did not have any relevant impact as even if 80% of Israeli wanted the end of
occupation,  the  active  minority  which  stands  up  against  this  move  would  block  the
process. He added that Israelis are more afraid of a civil war than anything else. Ilan
Greilsammer agreed and concluded that ‘Tel Aviv people’ – the protests mainly took place
in Tel Aviv – were living ‘in a bubble’ and would not be able to do anything against the
settler minority.
 
The EU-Israel relations in the context of the Arab
Awakening
16 Thirdly,  the  participants  were  asked  about  the  potential  consequences  of  the  Arab
Awakening on the EU-Israel relationship. Lior Herman stressed that the EU and Israel
were already supposed in 2008 to upgrade their relationships, two years and a half before
the start of the uprising in Tunisia. In fact, on the 16th of June 2008, during the 8th EU-
Israel Association Council – a body set up by the 1995 Association Agreement – the EU
agreed to  upgrade the level  and the intensity  of  their  relations.  The Foreign Affairs
Council  confirmed  this  decision  on  the  8th of  December  2008.  This  upgrade  mainly
provides  for  the  deepening  of  their  political  and  strategic  relations  – through  the
consultation of Israeli representatives in several EU strategic committees, working groups
and bodies, among which the COPS – and their commercial relations through a deeper
integration  of  the  EU  internal  market  thanks  to  a  better  convergence  with  the
Community acquis. Yet, the operation Cast Lead carried out by the Israeli army in the
Gaza  Strip,  between the  27th of  December  and the  18 th of  January  2009,  interrupted
abruptly this process due to the harsh criticisms it triggered in Europe against Israel,
more particularly regarding the IDF intervention on the ground. 
17 Thus, though few commercial agreements have been signed or ratified since then in the
agricultural, pharmaceutical or air transport sectors, it is worth noting that the EU-Israeli
political  relations were already tense at  the time of  the beginning of  the upheavals.
Moreover, while this context did not foster the development of closer ties at the political
level,  mainly due to the disagreements regarding the Palestinian question,  Benedetta
Berti’s and Caroline du Plessix’s article shows that in the end the EU and Israel reacted to
the upheavals with the same willingness to defend their security interests and to adapt
their  policy  to  the  new  regional  landscape.  Accordingly,  the  impact  of  the  Arab
awakening on their relations should not be overestimated.
18 Yet,  from  an  EU  institutional  perspective,  the  political  linkage  constraining  their
relations, more particularly in the aftermath of the Lisbon treaty, may be strengthened in
this new context. First, it is worth noting that the EU position towards Israel is far from
being homogeneous. Lior Herman pointed out that among the EU institutions, positions
were  notably  divergent.  The  EU  Commission  does  not  share  the  same  method  and
objectives  than the  Member  States  for  instance.  The latter,  he  noted,  through their
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positions  in  the  European  Council  and  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council,  are  much  more
sensitive  to  political  criticisms  among  their  populations.  Moreover,  while  the  EU
Commission’s role is supposed to be more technical when it comes to the EU’s external
relations, the European Parliament voices the European citizens’ opinions towards Israel,
more critical in the aftermath of the operation Cast Lead. And the Lisbon treaty, ratified
in  December  2009,  granted  the  latter  the  veto  power  over  the  signature  of  EU
international  agreements.  This rise in power of  the European Parliament in the EU’s
external policy may slow down the momentum of the EU-Israel relations in the future,
more particularly if Israel does not answer the EU’s political expectations vis-à-vis the
Palestinian  issue.  In  this  sense,  the  frustration  expressed  by  the  EU diplomats  with
respect to the stalemate in the peace process as well as Israel’s unchanged policy towards
Palestinians despite the regional turmoil may further constrain the deepening of their
relationship.
19 Alfred Tovias expressed a contrasting view regarding the evolving dynamics taking place
within the EU-Israel relations. According to him, the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements to
the East made the EU less critical of Israel. This point of view is predicated upon the fact
that Eastern European Member States are generally the more supportive of Israel within
the  EU.  Alfred  also  emphasized  that  this  enlargement  triggered  a  rise  in  power  of
Germany among Member States, and that the latter often voices Israel’s demands in EU’s
institutions. Thus, despite the political linkage imposed by the EU to Israel, between the
resolution of the conflict and the deepening of their mutual relations, he expected the
‘Memory of History’ to play a more important role in their future relations. 
20 He insisted that the creation of Israel remained the ‘unfinished business’ of the two World
Wars and that it was in the EU’s best interest to ‘complete the work’. He acknowledged
the following paradox: Israel has to get accepted eventually in the region but it should
also return to Europe. He pointed out the need for Israel to be part of a regional block. As
it would never belong to the only Middle East regional organization, the Arab League, the
EU would  be  in  this  prospect  the  natural  hinterland of  Israel,  as  illustrated  by  the
excellent level of their commercial, scientific and cultural relations. Thus, he wondered
why, if the EU accepts Romania or Bulgaria as Member States, it would not accept Israel in
the end? “I  do not  want  only  God as  an ally,  unlike the Orthodox people  here”,  he
concluded, smiling. 
21 Against  this  backdrop,  Maya  Sion,  Post-Doctoral  fellow  at  the  Hebrew  University,
regretted for her part the lack of Israel’s strategic vision in its relations with the EU.
Despite the general desire in Israel to get closer to the EU and even to consider a future
membership, she mentioned the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, to integrate the
European acquis with respect to one of the four freedoms, the free movement of people.
As  a  matter  of  fact,  Israel  generally  fears  that  it  would  increase  foreign  workers’
emigration to Israel and foster the brain drain phenomena from Israel to Europe. 
22 Thus,  as  an alternative  option to  a  future  EU membership,  Maya alluded to  Shimon
Peres’s vision for a new Middle East and notably to his more recent idea of creating
projects of cooperation between the EU and Arab countries. This cooperation could be
funded, according to Shimon Peres, by the EU while Israel could contribute to it thanks to
its knowledge and innovations. Alfred Tovias strongly opposed this idea and recalled that
given that Arab states have lost several wars against Israel, the last thing the latter should
claim is that it would like to teach them something, in order not to offend them. 
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Consequences on Anti-Semitism in Europe
23 Finally the roundtable discussion focused on the issue of anti-Semitism in Europe and on
the potential impact of the Arab Awakening. Samuel Ghiles-Meilhac, who compares in his
article  the  Spanish  experience  of  normalization  of  its  relations  with  Israel  with  the
current state of relations between Tunisia and Israel, stressed the difficulty to define the
current pattern of anti-Semitism in Europe. He emphasized that its nature is different
from the political attacks emanating from Arab countries. In Europe, according to him,
there are not anymore political parties asserting that Jews should leave the country or
threatening them physically. In France for instance, he mentioned the current influence
of the Jewish community notably through the CRIF, the Representative Council of the
Jewish Institutions, whose dinner organized each year attracts a lot of French politicians,
among others. By contrast, he pointed out the importance of the widespread perception
in  Europe  of  a  current  demographic  threat  posed  by  the  Arab  community.  He  also
highlighted  that  during  the  Strauss  Khan  scandal  [former  head  of  the  IMF],  medias
generally did not refer to the myth of the ‘powerful Jews’ or any other anti-Semitic myth,
contrary to the Press reporting during the Dreyfus affair at the end of the 19th century in
France. Yet, he also pointed out that attacks against Jews have increased ultimately in
Europe, and notably in France as illustrated by the Toulouse shootings in 2012.
24 Colin Shindler agreed that in Europe the threat posed today by anti-Semitism is different.
In his article, in which he analyses the evolution of the positions of the European left
towards Israel,  he notably questions the actual  link between anti-Semitism and anti-
Zionism.  According  to  him,  the  rise  in  anti-Semitism today  can  take  the  form of  a
delegitimisation of the state of Israel as it can lead to the delegitimisation of the Jewish
people. Thus, he claimed that there could be in this context other attacks on Jews in
Europe. But he also stressed that the memory of what happened to the Jews during the
Shoah would not vanish with the new generation. He remarked that this new generation
has  inherited  the  memory  of  the  Shoah  from their  grand-parents  so  that  historical
distance is not an issue in this respect.
25 For her part, Julie Trottier highlighted that in France, physical violence against people
has increased in the last few years, not only against Jews but also against Arabs due to the
deterioration of the economic situation. Another participant pointed out that Jews are
today much more organized than Muslim people and that there is a noticeable rise in
Islamophobia in Europe today. He concluded that the Jewish community benefits today
from a comparative advantage in Europe. He illustrated this idea by the fact that Israel is
the only MENA country in which a citizen does not need a visa when travelling to the EU. 
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